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Abstract
This article contributes to the literature by examining the determinants of the existence of a critical mass of women on
boards. As critical mass theory suggests, the mere presence of women on boards may not be sufficient to bring
significant change to the boardroom and to improve corporate governance. While studying the determinants of female
presence on boards is useful, it may be helpful to study what are the characteristics of firms that have a sufficient
number of women to enhance governance. In this paper, we study the predictors of the existence of a critical mass of
women on S&P 100 boards between 1995 and 2010. We show that firms with at least three female directors have
larger boards, are larger, are more likely to be run by a female CEO and have a greater proportion of non-Caucasian
directors. On the contrary, we were not able to show significant differences in firm performance and board
independence between firms with and without a critical mass of women on their boards.
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1. Introduction 
In almost every country and every sector, female representation on corporate boards has 
increased in recent years. In an analysis of 3,000 companies across 40 countries worldwide, 
Credit Suisse (2014) documents that board diversity has progressed from 9.6% in 2010 to 
12.7% in 2013. As it is so often the case, this average hides significant disparities. While in 
some countries in Europe, the proportion of women directors is close to 30% (Finland, 
France, Sweden) or to 40% (Norway), in other countries such as Japan or Pakistan, women 
hold less than 1 out of 50 corporate board seats (i.e. less than 2%). 
According to Terjesen and Singh (2008), the differences between countries in the mean 
proportions of female directors are attributable to the social, political and economic structures 
of individual countries. In particular, they document that female directors are more numerous 
in countries characterized by more women in senior management levels, smaller gender pay 
gaps and a shorter period of women’s political representation. Grosvold and Brammer (2011, 
p.129) show “that as much as half of the variation across countries in the presence of women 
on corporate boards is attributable to institutional factors and that legal institutions appear 
to play the most significant role in shaping board diversity”. 
Moreover, there are wide disparities in the number of women serving on boards within each 
country. In the United States, for example, in 2013, 23.4% of Fortune 500 firms had three or 
more women directors but 10.2% of them had no women serving on their boards (Catalyst 
2013). Similarly, in the United Kingdom, in March 2015, 26% of FTSE 250 firms had at least 
25% female directors but 9.2% of them had no women serving on their boards (Female FTSE 
Board report 2015). This contrasting situation (with some firms having no women director 
and some other having several women directors) challenges to study the determinants of 
female presence on boards.  
However, relatively few studies have investigated this issue. Most studies have typically 
focused on the impact of board gender diversity on firm financial performance and have 
found mixed evidence. On the one hand, Carter et al. (2003), Campbell and Minguez-Vera 
(2008) and Liu et al. (2014) provide evidence that gender diversity enhances company 
performance. On the other hand, Bøhren and Strøm (2007) and Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
document a negative impact and Rose (2007), Francoeur et al. (2008) and Carter et al. (2010) 
no impact resulting from gender diversity. In an effort to reconcile these conflicting results, 
Post and Byron (2015) combined in a meta-analysis the results from 140 studies examining 
the relationship between women on boards and company performance. They show that female 
board representation is positively related to accounting returns but fail to a find a significant 
relationship between female board representation and market performance.  
The Tokenism Theory (Kanter, 1977) according to which firms appoint female directors for 
purely symbolic reasons and thus are not expected to participate as full members of the board 
could explain at least partially the absence of consistency or of significance in the relationship 
between women on boards and firm performance. Indeed, the mere presence of women on 
boards may not be sufficient to bring significant change to the boardroom and to improve 
corporate governance. According to Erkut et al. (2008) and Kramer et al. (2006) at least three 
females on boards are needed for actual changes in board dynamics to occur. Indeed, when 
there is a critical mass of women on board (at least three), women are more likely to be heard 
since gender is no longer a barrier to acceptance and communication (Konrad et al. 2008) 
which translates into an improvement in firm performance (Catalyst, 2011; Joecks et al., 
2013), in the level of firm innovation (Torchia et al., 2011) and in corporate social 
performance (Post et al., 2011). 
Therefore, while studying the determinants of female presence on boards is useful (Hillman et 
al., 2007; Geiger and Marlin, 2012 and Nekhili and Gatfaoui, 2013), in light of the Tokenism 
Theory, analyzing why some organizations have a critical mass of women on their boards but 
other do not is complementary. In this paper we examine the factors that impact the existence 
of a critical mass allowing female directors to affect the decision made by the board and not 
only the determinants of their presence.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops hypotheses regarding 
the variables that could impact the likelihood of the existence of a critical mass of female 
directors on boards. The methodology used to test these hypotheses is presented in Section 3. 
Section 4 provides our results and our conclusions are set forth in the final section.  
2. Hypotheses development 
Despite the difficulties met by women to obtain a board seat, a small number of women have 
broken the glass ceiling. However, their situation is contrasting with some firms having no 
women director and some other having several women directors. Some variables may be 
expected to impact the existence of a critical mass of women on boards.  
First, the overall size of the board may impact the existence of a critical mass of women on 
boards since, in larger boards, there are more seats available for potential female directors.  
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of the development of a critical mass of women on a specific 
board will increase with board size. 
Second, firm size may have an impact on the existence of a critical mass of women on boards 
because large firms are subject to more scrutiny by analysts and shareholders to increase the 
diversity of their boards. Moreover, the greater complexity of large firms may necessitate 
more monitoring.  As underlined by Adams and Ferreira (2009), women are supposed to be 
better monitors. Finally, because of the prestige, it may be easier for large firms to attract and 
maintain more women on their boards.  
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of the development of a critical mass of women on a specific 
board will increase with firm size. 
Third, the existence of a critical mass of women on boards could be associated to higher board 
independence. Existing research suggests that women are more likely to be outside directors 
(Carter et al., 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Simpson et al., 2010). Therefore, it is less 
likely for firms with a high proportion of dependent directors to reach a critical mass of 
women on boards.  
Hypothesis 3: The likelihood of the development of a critical mass of women on a specific 
board will increase with board independence. 
Fourth, CEO gender may have an impact on the existence of a critical mass of women on 
boards. In a recent article in the Wall Street Journal, Lublin (2014) underlines that many U.S. 
firms run by women have multiple female directors. More generally, Bilimoria (2006) 
establishes a positive relationship between the number of female directors and the number of 
female members of senior management in a sample of Fortune 500 firms. Thus, the presence 
of women in positions of visible authority may encourage and support effective representation 
of women on boards. 
Hypothesis 4: The likelihood of the development of a critical mass of women on a specific 
board will increase with the presence of a female CEO. 
Fifth, according to the resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), because 
firms are dependent on resources, they have to develop links with external environment for 
survival. A lack of control over these resources acts to create uncertainty for firms operating 
in that environment. Now, the board of directors is a primary linking mechanism for 
connecting a firm with external resources (Hillman et al., 2007). Thus, greater board diversity 
enhances overall board expertise and the number of important external linkages to the firm's 
environment (Hillman et al., 2002). Having a heterogeneous board can ensure that a variety of 
views and ideas is represented at the top. Thus, gender and ethnic diversity may be 
complementary. 
Hypothesis 5: The likelihood of the development of a critical mass of women on a specific 
board will increase with board ethnic diversity. 
Six, according to Farrell and Hersch (2005), better performing firms may have more females 
on their board. Due to internal and external calls for diversity, the demand for female directors 
allows women to self-select better performing firms. Since qualified women interested in 
serving on corporate boards are scarce, they may have the opportunity to choose to serve on 
better performing firms. Moreover, better performing firms may have more latitude to focus 
on diversity goals.  
Hypothesis 6: The likelihood of the development of a critical mass of women on a specific 
board will increase with firm performance. 
3. Data and methodology 
 
In order to test these 6 hypotheses we determine the exact composition of the boards of S&P 
100 firms between 1995 and 2010. To do this, we obtained the proxy statements from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission website1. Following Farrell and Hersch (2005) and 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), we exclude financial firms2  (SIC codes 6000-6999) and 
utilities industry3 (SIC codes 4900-4999) since board of directors in these companies may be 
subject to regulatory supervision affecting their governance system. Consequently, the final 
data set consists of an unbalanced sample of 78 firms and 1,181 firm-year observations. 
Our variable of interest is the existence of a critical mass of women on a specific board, a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there are at least 3 women on boards and 0 
otherwise. In this study, we analyze whether variables such as board size, firm size, board 
independence, CEO gender, board ethnic diversity or firm performance are determinants of 
the existence of a critical mass of women on boards. 
We define board size as the total number of directors on a given board (excluding Emeritus 
and Advisory member positions) and firm size is approximated by the natural logarithm of 
total assets. Three proxies were used to assess board independence: the proportion of co-opted 
directors (co-opted), the proportion of outside directors (outside) and the independence of the  
                                                          
1 http://www.sec.gov/ 
2 Financial institutions, insurance companies and real estate companies. 
3 Electric, gas and sanitary services. 
Table 1: Correlation coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
board size (1) 1.000           
CEO duality (2) 0.051 1.000          
women CEO (3) -0.211  0.008 1.000         
Co-opted (4) 0.125  -0.217  0.053 1.000        
ethnicity (5) 0.156  0.004 0.094  0.133  1.000       
outside (6) 0.030 0.245  -0.022 0.046 0.103  1.000      
ROA (7) -0.059  -0.070  -0.010 -0.015 0.012 -0.094  1.000     
debt to equity (8) 0.216  0.111  0.058  0.138  0.135  0.085  -0.224  1.000    
firm size (9) 0.279  0.001 -0.096  0.119  0.277  -0.010 0.008 0.076  1.000   
shareholder returns (10) -0.093  -0.013 -0.004 -0.101  -0.133  -0.060  0.147  -0.074  -0.121 a 1.000  
total risk (11) -0.192  -0.004 0.057 -0.127  -0.174  -0.068  -0.216  -0.001 -0.233 a -0.161 a 1.000 
board chair (CEO duality). Co-opted directors are those appointed after the CEO assumes 
office. They are supposed to be less independent from the management than non co-opted 
directors since they were appointed by the current CEO and thus may feel beholden to him 
(Core et al. 1999 and Coles et al. 2014). Outside directors are non executive directors with no 
significant relationship with the company. In comparison to inside directors, there are 
supposed to have more freedom to ask difficult questions and to be more willing to stand up 
to the CEO to safeguard the interests of shareholders (Duchin et al. 2010). The independence 
of the board chair is measured by a dummy variable that is equal to one if the CEO is the 
board chair, and zero otherwise. If the CEO is also the chairperson, board independence is 
reduced since in case of CEO duality more difficult for the board to oppose a decision made 
by the CEO. Our dummy variable women CEO is equal to 1 if the CEO is a woman and to 0 
otherwise. The proportion of non Caucasian directors (ethnicity) is used to measure the impact 
of board ethnic diversity on the existence of a critical mass of women on boards. Finally, 
following Hillman et al. (2007), we used Return On Assets (ROA), debt to equity, shareholder 
returns and total risk as our performance measures. 4 ROA and debt to equity were collected 
from Thomson ONE Banker database. The two others performance measures have been 
computed by ourselves. Table 1 presents the correlation matrix among all the independent 
variables employed in this study. 
Table 1 gives us the correlation coefficients between all the variables.5 We can observe that 
the magnitude of the correlation coefficients is 0.3 or bellow suggesting that there is a weak 
correlation between the variables.  
4. Results 
The summary statistics for the whole sample and for our two subsamples (firms with and 
firms without a critical mass of women) are provided in Table 2. We observe major 
differences between firms with a critical mass of women on boards and those with no critical 
mass for different independent variables. For instance, firms with at least 3 female directors 
are much more frequently run by women CEO (in 16.8 % of the cases) than firms with less 
than 3 female directors (in 0.43 % of the cases). Similarly, firms with a critical mass of 
women on boards have larger board (13.37 directors on average) than firms with no critical 
mass of female directors (11.75 directors on average). These results suggest, among others 
that board size and CEO gender may be good determinants of the existence of a critical mass 
of women on a given board. On the contrary, for example the independence of the board chair 
and the ROA do not seem to allow discriminating between firms with a critical mass of 
women and firms with no critical mass since there are no important differences between our 
two subsamples. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 The shareholder return is a measure of the performance over the time. It combines share price appreciation 
and dividends to show the total return to the shareholder. It is expressed as a percentage as the compound 
annual growth rate.  
The risk of an asset may be measured by the dispersion of the possible returns below the expected value. In 
this way, the total risk is measured as the standard deviation of asset returns. 
5 Correlations involving dummies are only indicative. 
Table 2: Group statistics table 
Critical mass of women on boards Mean Std. deviation Number of obs. 
no critical mass board size 
firm size 
outside 
co-opted 
CEO duality 
women CEO 
ethnicity 
ROA 
debt to equity 
shareholder returns 
total risk 
11.753 
4.264 
0.810 
0.510 
0.575 
0.004 
0.117 
9.498 
76.023 
0.155 
0.021 
2.379 
0.458 
0.110 
0.300 
0.495 
0.065 
0.081 
7.438 
95.860 
0.355 
0.010 
931 
931 
931 
931 
931 
931 
931 
931 
931 
931 
931 
critical mass board size 
firm size 
outside 
co-opted 
CEO duality 
women CEO 
ethnicity 
ROA 
debt to equity 
shareholder returns 
total risk 
13.372 
4.524 
0.852 
0.526 
0.592 
0.168 
0.173 
9.250 
108.597 
0.070 
0.019 
2.699 
0.436 
0.080 
0.274 
0.492 
0.375 
0.090 
5.839 
115.796 
0.281 
0.009 
250 
250 
250 
250 
250 
250 
250 
250 
250 
250 
250 
total board size 
firm size 
outside 
co-opted 
CEO duality 
women CEO 
ethnicity 
ROA 
debt to equity 
shareholder returns 
total risk 
12.096 
4.319 
0.819 
0.513 
0.578 
0.039 
0.129 
9.446 
82.919 
0.137 
0.020 
 
2.537 
0.466 
0.106 
0.295 
0.494 
0.194 
0.086 
7.128 
101.237 
0.342 
0.010 
 
1,181 
1,181 
1,181 
1,181 
1,181 
1,181 
1,181 
1,181 
1,181 
1,181 
1,181 
 
Table 3 presents the univariate ANOVA results for the significance of the variables and 
shows strong statistical evidence of significant differences between our two subgroups for 
most of our independent variables. Our results provide strong statistical evidence of 
significant differences between the subgroups. Firms with a critical mass of female directors 
tends to have larger boards, are larger, are more likely to have a female CEO and have a 
higher proportion of non-Caucasian directors than firms without a critical mass. Regarding 
financial performance variables, 3 out of the 4 variables have significant differences between 
means in the two subsamples (debt to equity, shareholder returns and total risk). Only ROA 
does not seem to be a significant determinant of our independent variable. On the contrary, 
only 1 out of our 3 board independence measure (the proportion of outside directors) has 
significant differences between means in the two subsamples.  
Table 3 : Tests of equality of group means table 
 Wilk’s 
Lambda 
F     p-value 
board size 0.932 86.033 0.000* 
firm size 0.948 64.740 0.000* 
outside 0.974 32.071 0.000* 
co-opted 0.999 0.613 0.434 
CEO duality 1.000 0.243 0.622 
women CEO 0.881 159.964 0.000* 
ethnicity 0.931 87.583 0.000* 
ROA 1.000 0.238 0.625 
debt to equity 0.983 20.744 0.000* 
shareholder 
returns 0.990 12.128 0.001* 
total risk 0.991 10.162 0.001* 
*Significant at the 1% level. 
Table 4 provides the standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients and the 
structure matrix.  
 
The discriminant coefficients can be interpreted as those in a multiple regression. Therefore, 
the results show that women CEO and board size are the strongest predictors of the existence 
of a critical mass of women on boards. The positive signs indicate a positive relationship: 
firms with a critical mass of female directors have larger boards and are more likely to be run 
by female CEO. The relative importance of the predictors can be seen from the structure 
matrix. A coefficient higher than 0.30 suggests an important variable to discriminate between 
the two subgroups. Consequently, we conclude that board size, firm size, women CEO and 
ethnicity are good predictors and that firm performances and board independence are weak 
predictors of the existence of a critical mass of female directors.  
 
The results clearly support Hypothesis 1. Firms with at least 3 female directors have larger 
boards than firms with less than 3 female directors. This result is consistent with Agrawal and 
Knoeber (2001) and Carter et al. (2003) in the US and Brammer et al. (2007) in UK who 
show a positive relation between board size and the percentage of women directors. Our 
results also show that the likelihood of the development of a critical mass of women on a 
specific board increases with firm size. This validates Hypothesis 2 and is consistent with 
Agrawal and Knoeber (2001), Hyland and Marcellino (2002), Carter et al. (2003) and Wang 
and Clift (2009) who show a positive relation between firm size and the percentage of women 
directors. On the contrary, Hypothesis 3 is rejected since our 3 measures of board 
independence are weak predictors of the existence of a critical mass of women on boards. 
These results contrast with Geiger and Marlin (2011) who show that a positive relationship 
exists (significant at the 1%) between the percentage of outside board members and the 
percentage of women on the board. This indicates that the determinants of the percentage of 
women on boards and the determinants of the existence of a critical mass of women on boards 
are different. Hypotheses 4 and 5 are supported by the data and constitute original results. 
Firms with at least 3 women on boards are more likely to be run by a female CEO and have a 
greater proportion of non-Caucasian directors. Finally, Hypothesis 6 is rejected since none of 
our performance measure significantly impacts the existence of a critical mass of women on 
boards. This result agrees well with Hillman et al. (2007) who document that most of their 
performance variables are not associated with female representation on a board. 
Table 4 : Summary of the canonical discriminant function 
 
 Standardized canonical 
discriminant function 
coefficients 
Structure matrix 
board size 0.511 0.456 
firm size 0.279 0.396 
Outside 0.296 0.279 
co-opted -0.178 0.038 
CEO duality -0.122 0.024 
women CEO 0.752 0.622 
Ethnicity 0.211 0.460 
ROA 0.043 -0.024 
debt to equity 0.038 0.224 
shareholder returns -0.065 -0.171 
total risk -0.004 -0.157 
Eigenvalue 
Canonical correlation 
Wilk’s Lambda Analysis 
Wilk’s Lambda coefficient 
Chi-square 
Sig. 
0.351 
0.510 
 
0.740 
352.77 
0.000 
 
5. Conclusion 
The issue of female representation on corporate boards has been one of the key business 
debates of the decade. However, most studies have typically focused on the impact of the 
presence of women on financial performance. Therefore, while women are still largely 
underrepresented as directors, very few studies have examined the determinants of female 
presence on boards. Moreover, as critical mass theory suggests, the mere presence of women 
on boards may not be sufficient to bring significant change to the boardroom and to improve 
corporate governance. While studying the determinants of female presence on boards is 
useful, it may be helpful to study what are the characteristics of firms that have a sufficient 
number of women to enhance governance. 
Knowing that women are still significantly underrepresented on corporate boards and that 
female board representation is far from uniform across firms, some firm or board 
characteristics may hinder the growth of female representation on boards. Firms seeking to 
benefit from board gender diversity should take into account these factors. In this paper, we 
study the predictors of the existence of a critical mass of women on S&P 100 boards between 
1995 and 2010. We show that firms with at least three female directors have larger boards, are 
larger, are more likely to be run by a female CEO and have a greater proportion of non-
Caucasian directors. On the contrary, we were not able to show significant differences in firm 
performance and board independence between firms with and without a critical mass of 
women on their boards. 
The contributions of this work are multiple. First, this article contributes to the literature by 
examining the determinants of the existence of a critical mass of women on boards. While 
some studies have explored the determinants of female presence on boards (Hillman et al., 
2007; Geiger and Marlin, 2012 and Nekhili and Gatfaoui, 2013), the critical mass theory 
invites us to consider the characteristics of firms with at least three female directors. To the 
best of our knowledge, this research is the first to study the determinants of the existence of a 
critical mass of women on boards. We believe that this approach is a good complement to the 
existing works: by studying whether or not there is a critical mass of female directors, we can 
better explore under what conditions a firm’s board is more likely to take full advantage from 
board diversity. 
Second, we show that some predictors of the percentage of women on boards (in particular 
board independence) are not good predictors of the existence of a critical mass of women on 
boards. This confirms the interest to study specifically the determinants of the critical mass. 
Third, we identify new predictors that significantly impact the likelihood of female 
representation on boards of directors. For instance, we show that firms with at least three 
women on boards are more likely to be run by a female CEO. This result is significant 
because it demonstrates that the presence of women in positions of visible authority may 
encourage and support effective representation of women on boards. Similarly, we show that 
firms with a critical mass of women have a greater proportion of non-Caucasian directors. 
Therefore, other form of board diversity could have a positive impact on board gender 
diversity. 
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